Endowment additivity and the weighted proportional rules for adjudicating conflicting claims by Harless, Patrick
 
 
 
 
Harless, P. (2017) Endowment additivity and the weighted proportional 
rules for adjudicating conflicting claims. Economic Theory, 63(3), pp. 755-
781. (doi:10.1007/s00199-016-0960-9) 
 
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it. 
 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/129220/ 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 30 September 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
Endowment additivity and the weighted proportional rules for
adjudicating conflicting claims
Patrick Harless∗
February 11, 2016
Abstract
We propose and study a new axiom, restricted endowment additivity, for the problem of adju-
dicating conflicting claims. This axiom requires that awards be additively decomposable with
respect to the endowment whenever no agent’s claim is filled. For two-claimant problems, re-
stricted endowment additivity essentially characterizes weighted extensions of the proportional
rule. With additional agents, however, the axiom is satisfied by a great variety of rules. Further
imposing versions of continuity and consistency, we characterize a new family of rules which
generalize the proportional rule. Defined by a priority relation and a weighting function, each
rule aims, as nearly as possible, to assign awards within each priority class in proportion to
these weights. We also identify important subfamilies and obtain new characterizations of the
constrained equal awards and proportional rules based on restricted endowment additivity.
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1 Introduction
Claims problems arise in various guises throughout history with fascinating recommendations de-
scribed even in the Babylonian Talmud (O’Neill 1982; Aumann and Maschler 1985). A claims
problem consists of a group of agents, each with a claim on an endowment, and a rule specifies how
the endowment will be divided. Capturing a fundamental economic problem of resource allocation,
the simple model has spawned a vast and growing literature1 and provides a testing ground for
theories of equity.2 In this setting, we propose and study a new additivity axiom. Intimately linked
to the principle of proportionality, our results uncover a family of rules which allow diverse answers
to the question Proportional to what?
Our primary axiom adapts the familiar notion of additivity, a property commonly sought for
strategic and practical reasons3 and now a bedrock principle for cost sharing.4 The general principle
requires that problems be additively decomposable along some dimensions. A first possibility is
to require additivity on all dimensions, both the claims and the endowment in our setting. We
will argue that, at least in some settings, claims represent intrinsic features which should not be
decomposed. Even when desirable, additivity on both the claims and the endowment is incompatible
with our feasibility constraints.5
We instead take as our starting point endowment additivity, which requires that problems be
additively decomposable with respect only to the endowment. More concretely, when two problems
are formed from a third problem by dividing its endowment into two parts while retaining the
original vector of claims, endowment additivity requires that the award of each agent in the original
problem equal the sum of her awards in the auxiliary problems. Consistent with feasibility but still
very strong, this axiom alone characterizes the proportional rule (Moulin 1987).6 Because endow-
ment additivity applies simultaneously to large and small endowments, much of its strength stems
from the feasibility requirements. Our axiom aims to capture the spirit of endowment additivity
without sacrificing all flexibility by limiting the scope: Restricted endowment additivity requires
additive decomposability for those problems in which no agent is fully compensated.7 These are
often the problems of interest, particularly with a taxation gloss: Our axiom applies except in those
unfortunate cases in which some agents have already contributed their entire incomes.
The normative appeal for our axiom, as well as endowment additivity, depends on how we
1See Thomson (2003, 2014, 2015a) for surveys.
2See Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2006), for example.
3See, for example, Moulin (1987) and Ju et al. (2007).
4Shapley (1953) provides the classic axiomatization invoking additivity and Moulin (2013) discusses recent appli-
cations.
5See Bergantin˜os and Me´ndez-Naya (2001) and the discussion in Thomson (2014).
6As described in Remark 4 of Moulin (1987), this characterization is a corollary of his Theorem 5 which applies
this property to surplus sharing problems.
7Restricted versions of joint additivity in claims and the endowment lead to additional rules (Bergantin˜os and
Vidal-Puga 2004, 2006). With other axioms, notions along these lines lead to the “minimal overlap” rule (Alcalde
et al. 2008; Marchant 2008).
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interpret claims. When we allow asymmetric treatment among agents, we acknowledge that their
names convey relevant information. For example, we may differentiate claims of individuals from
those of corporations or of the government. By formulating subproblems with a common claims
vector as in restricted endowment additivity, we extend this idea to claims, taking the position that
they represent intrinsic features and may not be divided arbitrarily. This is the correct approach
when claims are partitioned into classes. For example, small claims may be eligible for small-
claims court and so warrant uniform treatment, whereas large claims require different treatment.
Similarly, a claim below a certain threshold may be eligible for class action or a claim above a
different threshold may be eligible for private arbitration; dividing a large claim or consolidating
several small claims would erase important information and be invalid. Taking instead a taxation
perspective, eligibility for a particular government program or liability for a given tax may depend
on one’s tax bracket or whether one’s income falls below a poverty line; spreading one’s income
across several jobs should not change the tax bracket to which one belongs. Just as age, disability,
or socio-economic status may be relevant to classification, so too may be an agent’s income.8
Continuing with the taxation interpretation, we describe practical advantages enjoyed by rules
satisfying restricted endowment additivity. Suppose that the total burden derives from two taxing
entities, perhaps a city and a state, or as requisitions for two separate projects.9 Endowment addi-
tivity ensures that these problems may be handled independently; restricted endowment additivity
requires coordination only to check whether the joint burden will require some agents to contribute
their entire incomes. By decentralizing the process, the city and state can determine liabilities
knowing only each agent’s income. By contrast, consider the familiar “composition” axiom.10 It
also permits these problems to be considered separately, but requires that one problem be labeled
“first” so that incomes may be updated in the second problem. Applying a rule satisfying this
property, the city may assign liabilities differently among the agents depending on whether it acts
first or second, and the two entities may not act simultaneously. Although the entities collect and
agents pay the same total amounts, the necessity of coordination presents practical difficulties and
the dependence on the temporal order appears arbitrary.
In conjunction with restricted endowment additivity, we study a weaker version of the familiar
consistency principle. The general principle considers a situation in which one agent leaves with her
award, creating a reduced problem in which the endowment is reduced by this amount. Consistency
requires that each agent receive the same award in the reduced problem as in the original prob-
8As another example, some cultural norms call for the highest status or wealthiest person to bear the cost of
a communal meal or celebration. Although paying for a large banquet may reverse the ex-post wealth ranking,
responsibility for future expenses depends on the original ranking and the same individual will pay, provided her
wealth is not entirely exhausted.
9From a claims perspective, these might be two funding agencies from which researchers have requested funds or
departments with overlapping responsibilities for reimbursing costs included by individuals.
10A class of “baseline extension operators” generalize the logic of composition and define new rules from existing
rules by first making a baseline award and then applying the original rule to an updated auxiliary problem (Hougaard
et al. 2012, 2013). Similar observations apply to these rules as well.
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lem. Our axiom, full compensation consistency, applies the principle to those cases in which the
departing agent receives her full claim. As these cases constitute a small proportion of problems,
full compensation consistency substantially weakens consistency. As we will see, full compensation
consistency and restricted endowment additivity reinforce each other, as full compensation consis-
tency gains traction precisely when restricted endowment additivity falls silent. Finally, we impose
endowment continuity throughout.11
The implications of restricted endowment additivity are easiest to describe geometrically as
restrictions on a “path of awards”, the locus of awards vectors that a rule assigns for a given claims
vector as the endowment varies. For two-claimant problems, restricted endowment additivity is very
strong, requiring that the path follow a ray from the origin until one agent’s claim is filled. With
endowment continuity, the remainder of the path consists of either a vertical or horizontal segment
(Proposition 2). On the other hand, with three or more claimants, restricted endowment additivity
has limited force. It continues to require that each path of awards initially follow a ray from the
origin, but is mute once one agent receives her full claim. In particular, restricted endowment
additivity has no force in problems where any agent has a zero claim. Here full compensation
consistency plays an essential role, duly extending the scope of restricted endowment additivity to
all problems.
Building on the intuition from two-claimant problems, we briefly describe the families of rules
arising from our analysis. First are the weighted proportional (W-proportional) rules, each defined
by a function which assigns weights to agent-claim pairs. A W-proportional rule assigns awards
proportionally with respect to that weighting function to the greatest extent possible. Intuitively,
the path of awards moves toward a target determined by the weights, deviating only to ensure
feasibility after some agents’ claims are filled. While W-proportional rules allow for an essentially
arbitrary weighting function, they exclude limiting cases in which some agents have full priority
over others. The priority-augmented weighted proportional (PW-proportional) rules generalize
the W-proportional rules by “filling in the gaps”. Two parameters, a weighting function and a
priority relation over agent-claim pairs, describe a PW-proportional rule.12 The priority relation
partitions the claims in each problem into priority classes, and awards within each class are made
according to the weighting function as with W-proportional rules. The family includes, naturally,
the proportional rule, as well as the constrained equal awards rule, the priority rules, and many
new rules.
The combination of restricted endowment additivity and full compensation consistency, together
with endowment continuity, implies that a rule follows a PW-proportional rule for each fixed popu-
11Continuity is typically required jointly for the endowment and claims, something we do not impose. This accords
our interpretation of claims as intrinsic features not assumed to be decomposable.
12As with weights, it is important that the priorities be over agent-claim pairs. This allows, for example, the same
agent to be in different tax brackets when her income changes. Similarly, two creditors with the same numerical
claims, perhaps representing an individual and a corporation, may be in different priority classes.
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lation (Theorem 1). Strengthening full compensation consistency to consistency imposes uniformity
across populations, thereby characterizing the PW-proportional rules (Theorem 2). Notably, al-
though the axiom is not imposed in our characterization, all PW-proportional rules are endowment
monotonic, meaning that an agent’s award never decreases when the endowment increases (Proposi-
tion 1).13 Within the family, additional axioms place restrictions on the priority orders and weight
functions (Corollary 2). Most significantly, we distinguish the W-proportional rules by minimal
sharing, the very mild requirement that no agent with a positive claim receive her full claim while
another agent with a positive claim receives nothing (Theorem 3). Our final result considers the
distribution of losses as well as awards: Restricted endowment additivity and self-duality,14 the
requirement that losses be allocated according to the same principle as awards, characterize the
proportional rule (Theorem 4).
It will be easier to compare our rules to families identified previously after formalizing our
results, so we postpone further discussion of related literature and turn immediately to the model.
In Section 2, we introduce our axioms and the PW-proportional rules. Section 3 presents our
characterizations and Section 4 situates our work within the literature. All proofs appear in the
appendix.
2 Model
A claims problem consists of a finite set of agents with conflicting claims over an amount to divide.
Formally,15 there is a countable set of potential agents N ⊆ N with |N | ≥ 2. For N ⊆ N , N ′ ⊆ N ,
and x ∈ RN+ , let xN ′ ≡ (xi)i∈N ′ denote the components of x corresponding to N ′. We write xi
for x{i} and also x−i for xN\{i}. To denote vector inequalities, for each N ⊆ N and each pair
x, y ∈ RN+ , we write x y if for each i ∈ N , xi < yi; x ≤ y if for each i ∈ N , xi ≤ yi; and x < y if
x ≤ y and there is i ∈ N such that xi < yi.
Given N ⊆ N , a claims problem for N is a pair (c, E) ∈ RN+ × R+ such that E ≤
∑
N ci.
For each i ∈ N , ci is agent i’s claim and E is the endowment. The set of all claims problems for
N is CN ≡ {(c, E) ∈ RN+ × R+ : E ≤∑N ci}. A rule is a mapping ϕ defined on ⋃N⊆N CN such
that for each N ⊆ N and each (c, E) ∈ CN , 0 ≤ ϕ(c, E) ≤ c and ∑N ϕi(c, E) = E.
Some additional notation will be useful. Let U be the collection of functions u : N ×R+ → R+
such that for each i ∈ N , u(i, ·) is strictly positive on R++. Within this collection, we distinguish
those which are symmetric in the first argument: Let U∗ ⊆ U consist of those functions u ∈ U such
that for each pair i, j ∈ N , u(i, ·) = u(j, ·). Finally, we denote a complete and transitive relation
13For another case in which endowment monotonicity is implied by the combination of consistency and other
axioms, none of which directly imply the property, see Young (1987b).
14Aumann and Maschler (1985) introduce this property and Young (1987b) also uses it to characterize the propor-
tional rule. Via duality, our results identify and characterize the “dual” families of our rules (Remark 4).
15Let N denote the natural numbers and let R, R+, and R++ denote respectively the real, non-negative real, and
positive real numbers.
5
on N × R+ by ≺ and write Π for the collection of all such relations.
2.1 Properties
To introduce our properties, let ϕ be a rule. We begin with the central axiom of our study: If
no agent’s claim is filled by applying the rule, then the awards vector for that problem may be
equivalently obtained by dividing the endowment and adding the awards vectors when the rule is
applied separately to each resulting problem.16
Restricted endowment additivity: For each N ⊆ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each pair E1, E2 ∈
R+ with E = E1 + E2, if ϕ(c, E) c, then ϕ(c, E) = ϕ(c, E1) + ϕ(c, E2).
Importantly, the claims vector is the same in all three problems. This contrast with the hypotheti-
cals defining “full” additivity, which no rule satisfies (Bergantin˜os and Me´ndez-Naya 2001), as well
as the composition axioms (Young 1987a; Moulin 2000).
Our second concern is the behavior of the rule when some agents depart with their awards. We
begin with the standard requirement17 in this situation: If one agent departs with her award, then
the awards of the remaining agents should be unchanged when the rule is reapplied to distribute
the reduced endowment among those agents.
Consistency: For each N ⊆ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each i ∈ N , ϕ−i(c, E) = ϕ
(
c−i, E −
ϕi(c, E)
)
.
By iteration, consistency further implies the same conclusion when a group of agents depart with
their awards.
Our next axiom limits the requirements of consistency to those cases in which the departing
agent receives her full claim.18
Full compensation consistency: For each N ⊆ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each i ∈ N , if
ϕi(c, E) = ci, then ϕ−i(c, E) = ϕ(c−i, E − ci).
16For comparison and future reference, we state (unrestricted) endowment additivity and the composition axioms
together in parallel fashion: For each N ⊆ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each pair E1, E2 ∈ R+ with E = E1 + E2,
Endowment additivity: ϕ(c, E1 + E2) = ϕ(c, E1) + ϕ(c, E2).
Composition up: ϕ(c, E1 + E2) = ϕ(c, E1) + ϕ
(
c− ϕ(c, E1), E2) = ϕ(c− ϕ(c, E2), E1)+ ϕ(c, E2).
Composition down: ϕ(c, E1) = ϕ
(
ϕ(c, E1 + E2), E1
)
and ϕ(c, E2) = ϕ
(
ϕ(c, E1 + E2), E2
)
.
The axioms are similar in that they each decompose a given problem into subproblems, but differ in how they treat
claims. In contrast with with restricted endowment additivity, these axioms apply to all claims problems.
17See Thomson (2012) for a thorough normative analysis of the consistency principle and Thomson (2015b) for a
survey on its applications.
18Thomson (2014) mentions this property in passing, and Ju and Moreno-Ternero (2014) introduce an adapted
version for an augmented model with exchange.
6
As with consistency, full compensation consistency further implies that awards remain unchanged
when several agents whose claims are filled leave simultaneously. As its limited applicability sug-
gests, full compensation consistency is a much milder requirement than consistency ; an important
example satisfying full compensation consistency but not consistency is the “random arrival” rule
(O’Neill 1982; Chun and Thomson 2005). Similarly, a rule constructed by applying different “equal
sacrifice” rules (Young 1987a) across populations satisfies full compensation consistency but not
consistency.
A more familiar weakening of consistency, null claims consistency, further limits the require-
ment to cases in which the departing agent has a zero claim.19
Our third concern is how a rule responds to small changes in the endowment. Our requirement
here is standard: Small changes in the endowment should lead to at most small changes in awards.
Endowment continuity: For each N ⊆ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each sequence Eν ∈ R+ with
(c, Eν) ∈ CN , if Eν → E, then ϕ(c, Eν)→ ϕ(c, E).
As we will see, restricted endowment additivity implies a limited form of endowment continuity
which applies when the endowment is below a threshold (Lemma 1).20 Another notion, claims
continuity, applies to small changes in the claims vector. Also common is the stronger property
joint continuity which considers simultaneous changes in the claims and endowment.21
Our next axiom also pertains to changes in the endowment and requires that all agents’ awards
move in the same direction: If the endowment decreases, no agent’s award should increase.
Endowment monotonicity: For each N ⊆ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each E′ ∈ R+, if E′ ≤ E,
then ϕ(c, E′) ≤ ϕ(c, E).
Endowment monotonicity implies endowment continuity.
Our next axioms concern the equity of the awards vectors. Our first requirement limits the
extent to which one agent may be favored over another: If two agents have positive claims, then
neither agent should be fully compensated while the other receives a null award.22
Minimal sharing: For each N ⊆ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , each pair i, j ∈ N , if ϕi(c, E) = ci > 0,
then either ϕj(c, E) > 0 or cj = 0.
19The formal requirement is: For each N ⊆ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each i ∈ N , if ci = 0, then ϕ−i(c, E) =
ϕ(c−i, E).
20A previous version of this paper considered a weaker requirement, parallel to full compensation consistency, which
avoids this overlap. Details are available from the author.
21See, for example, Young (1987b).
22A similar, slightly stronger condition requires that in each problem with a positive endowment, those individuals
with positive claims receive positive awards. This axiom is studied as “positive share” by Moulin (2002) and “positive
awards” by Flores-Szwagrzak (2015).
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Minimal sharing allows for considerable asymmetry, even among agents with equal claims. Our
second requirement says that agents with equal claims should receive equal awards.
Equal treatment of equals: For each N ⊆ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , each pair i, j ∈ N , if ci = cj ,
then ϕi(c, E) = ϕj(c, E).
While the implication of equal treatment of equals is more substantive, minimal sharing applies to
a wider range of problems and so the axioms are logically distinct. A related equity requirement
requires symmetric treatment of the agents: A rule is anonymous if permuting the components
of the claims vector leads to a corresponding permutation of components of the awards vector).
We conclude with a standard axiom which plays a minor rule in our analysis.23 It says that
the awards assigned by the rule should not change when each agent’s claim is truncated at the
endowment.
Claims truncation invariance: For eachN ⊆ N and each (c, E) ∈ CN , ϕ((min{ci, E})i∈N , E) =
ϕ(c, E).
2.2 Proportional family
Our rules arising in our study generalize the notion of proportional division. A rule in the family
is calibrated by a function u ∈ U which assigns to each agent-claim pair a fixed weight. The rule
then divides the endowment proportionally to these weights to the greatest extent possible given
feasibility constraints.
Weighted proportional rule with weights u ∈ U , Pu: For each N ⊆ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN ,
and each i ∈ N , P ui (c, E) ≡ min{λu(i, ci), ci} where λ ∈ R+ is chosen so that
∑
N P
u
i (c, E) =
E.
For short, we call these W-proportional rules. Figure 1 depicts the paths of awards24 for several
examples of W-proportional rules applied to two-claimant problems. In general, the paths of awards
are piecewise linear with at most |N | segments. Whenever all agents receive awards less than their
claims, a W-proportional rule assigns awards proportionally according to u: for each N ⊆ N and
each (c, E) ∈ CN , if P u(c, E)  c, then P ui (c, E) = u(i,ci)∑
N u(j,cj)
· E. Letting x ≡ P u(c, E), for each
pair i, j ∈ N , xiu(i,ci) =
xj
u(j,cj)
. By comparison, applying the weighting function in the spirit of
Young (1987a) and Chambers and Moreno-Ternero (2015), we would have instead u(i,xi)u(i,ci) =
u(j,xj)
u(j,cj)
.
23Curiel et al. (1987) introduce this property to distinguish rules which correspond to cooperative game solutions
and Dagan (1996) studies the axiom under the name “independence of irrelevant claims”. It is implied by “contraction
independence” studied by Kıbrıs (2012), Kıbrıs (2013), and Stovall (2014b).
24For each c ∈ RN+ , the path of awards of ϕ for c consists of the locus of awards vectors as the endowment
varies: {ϕ(c, E) : 0 ≤ E ≤∑N ci}.
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Remark 1. Each W-proportional rule admits multiple representations in terms of weighting func-
tions. As only the relative weights assigned by u are relevant to determining the awards, various
normalizations are possible.
(a) CEA. (b) Proportional rule.
(c) Greater weight on the larger claim. (d) Greater weight on the smaller claim.
Figure 1: Illustrating W-proportional rules. In the figure, N ≡ {1, 2} and u(c) ≡ (u(1, c1), u(2, c2)).
(a) If for each (i, c0) ∈ N ×R+, u(i, c0) = 1, then Pu = CEA. (b) If for each (i, c0) ∈ N ×R+, u(i, c0) = ci,
then Pu = P . (c,d) Compared to the proportional rule, a W-proportional rule may be more favorable to
agents with large claims or to agents with small claims.
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Remark 2. If for each (i, c0) ∈ N × R+, u(i, c0) = c0, then P u is the proportional rule. If for
each (i, c0) ∈ N × R+, u(i, c0) = 1, then P u is the constrained equal awards rule (CEA).25
We denote these rules by P and CEA respectively.
The W-proportional family is diverse and, because the weighting functions are essentially unre-
stricted, contains rules that treat agents highly asymmetrically. However, the family excludes rules
which give full priority to some agents or to some numerical claims. Intuitively, our next family
“fills in the gaps” by including these limiting cases. Formally, we introduce priority classes through
an order ≺∈ Π. Building from the W-proportional rules, rules in the next family are parameterized
jointly by a priority relation and a weighting function.
Priority-augmented weighted proportional rule with priority order ≺∈ Π and weights u ∈ U , P≺,u:
For each N ⊆ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each i ∈ N , let N≺i ≡ {j ∈ N : (j, cj) ≺ (i, ci)},
N∼i ≡ {j ∈ N : (j, cj) ∼ (i, ci)}, and define
P≺,ui (c, E) ≡

0 if E ≤∑N≺i cj
ci if
∑
N≺i ∪N∼i cj ≤ E
P ui
(
cN∼i , E −
∑
N≺i
cj
)
otherwise
.
We refer to these rules briefly as PW-proportional rules. When ≺ is the complete indifference
relation, so all agent-claim pairs are in the same priority class, these are simply W-proportional
rules. At the other extreme, if for each pair i, j ∈ N either (i) for each pair x, y ∈ R+, (i, x) ≺ (j, y)
or (ii) for each pair x, y ∈ R+, (j, x) ≺ (i, y), then we obtain a standard priority rule.
The priorities and weights defining a PW-proportional rule may depend on the identities agents
as well as their claims, but these priorities and weights are uniform across populations. Relaxing
this uniformity, we obtain rules that coincide with a PW-proportional rule for each fixed population,
though possibly a different PW-proportional rule for each population. A rule ϕ is a collection of
fixed-population PW-proportional rules if for each N ⊆ N , there are ≺N∈ Π and uN ∈ U
such that for each (c, E) ∈ CN , ϕ(c, E) = P≺N ,uN (c, E). That is, ϕ = (P≺N ,uN )
N⊆N .
Our leading axioms will impose some structure on the priorities and weights employed across
populations, although less than the uniformity defining PW-proportional rules. We distinguish
collections of priorities and weights such that the departure of an agent whose claim is filled does
not change the relative priorities and weights assigned to the agents who remain. Formally, a
collection (≺N , uN )N⊆N is path consistent if: For each N ⊆ N , each triple i, j, k ∈ N , and each
triple ci, cj , ck ∈ R+, if either (i) (i, ci) ≺N (j, cj) or (ii) uN (i, ci) · cj > uN (j, cj) · ci, then both
(a) j ≺N\{i} k ⇔ j ≺N k and (b) uN (j, cj) · uN (k, ck) = uN\{i}(j, cj) · uN\{i}(k, ck). Conditions (i)
25Another leading rule, the constrained equal losses rule (CEL), is not a W-proportional rule. It is the “dual”
of CEA and is defined for each N ⊆ N and each (c, E) ∈ CN by CEL(c, E) = c− CEA(c,∑N ci − E).
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and (ii) identify an agent i whose claim is filled before that of another agent j. Then (a) and (b)
require that removing agent i does not change the priority or weight assigned to agent j relative
to any other agent k. Finally, a path-consistent collection of PW-proportional rules is a
collection of fixed-population PW-proportional rules with path-consistent priorities and weights.
Remark 3. Conditions (i) and (ii) for path consistency are never met when the proportional rule
is applied. Therefore, redefining a path-consistent rule to coincide with the proportional rule for a
given population and all supersets of that population preserves path consistency.
3 Main results
Our main results characterize those rules satisfying restricted endowment additivity, full compen-
sation consistency, and endowment continuity (Theorem 1) as well as the subfamilies of PW-
proportional rules (Theorem 2) and W-proportional rules (Theorem 3). First, we elaborate on
properties shared by all W-proportional rules.
Proposition 1. Each W-proportional rule satisfies minimal sharing, endowment monotonicity,
consistency, and restricted endowment additivity.
We omit the straightforward, if tedious, verifications.26 Endowment monotonicity implies en-
dowment continuity, so the W-proportional rules satisfy this property as well. On the other hand,
W-proportional rules need not be continuous in the vector of claims.
As the PW-proportional rules are defined from the W-proportional rules, they inherit some of
their properties.
Corollary 1. Each PW-proportional rule satisfies endowment monotonicity, consistency, and re-
stricted endowment additivity.
In contrast with the properties in Corollary 1, PW-proportional rules do not generally satisfy
minimal sharing as this property precludes non-trivial priorities. Next we introduce a technical
lemma which provides a useful reformulation of restricted endowment additivity : Beginning from
a problem in which no claim is filled, scaling down the endowment leads to a proportional scaling
down of awards.
Lemma 1. A rule ϕ satisfies restricted endowment additivity if and only if for each N ⊆ N , each
(c, E) ∈ CN , and α ∈ [0, 1], if ϕ(c, E) c, then ϕ(c, αE) = αϕ(c, E).
As a consequence of Lemma 1, restricted endowment additivity implies a limited form of en-
dowment continuity, namely for those endowments smaller than the smallest claim.
26A complete proof appears in the working paper version of this paper available from the author.
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3.1 Two-claimant problems
We next consider two-claimant problems. On this domain, restricted endowment additivity is very
strong. Together with endowment continuity, it requires that each of the rule’s paths of of awards
follow that of a PW-proportional rule.
Proposition 2. On the domain of two-claimant problems, a rule satisfies restricted endowment
additivity and endowment continuity if and only if it is a collection of fixed-population PW-
proportional rules.
The combination of endowment continuity and restricted endowment additivity implies endow-
ment monotonicity, although neither axiom implies it independently. By restricted endowment
additivity alone, if one agent’s claim is filled in a problem, then the claim of at least one agent must
be filled at each larger endowment. For endowments larger than the largest claim, however, which
agent’s claim is filled may vary arbitrarily as the endowment increases. Endowment continuity pre-
vents this. Figure 2 illustrates the path of awards for some discontinuous rules satisfying restricted
endowment additivity. Example 1 illustrates the role of endowment continuity in Proposition 2.
Example 1. A rule satisfying restricted endowment additivity but not endowment
continuity. For each N ⊆ N with |N | = 2 and each (c, E) ∈ CN , label the agents so that c1 ≤ c2
and let
ϕ(c, E) ≡
CEA(c, E) if E < c2(E − c2, c2) if c2 ≤ E .
For each N ⊆ N with |N | = 2 and each (c, E) ∈ CN , if ϕ(c, E) c, then ϕ(c, E) = CEA(c, E), so
ϕ satisfies restricted endowment additivity. However, ϕ violates endowment continuity : Let N ≡
{1, 2} and cN ≡ (2, 4). Then for each E ∈ R+ with E < 4, ϕ(c, E) = (E2 , E2 ) and limE→4− ϕ(c, E) =
(2, 2). However, ϕ(c, 4) = (0, 4).
3.2 Problems with an arbitrary number of claimants
Our general results build on Proposition 2. By invoking full compensation consistency, we charac-
terize those rules whose components form path-consistent collections of PW-proportional rules.
Theorem 1. A rule satisfies restricted endowment additivity, full compensation consistency,
and endowment continuity if and only if it is a path-consistent collection of fixed-population PW-
proportional rules.
For two-claimant problems, coincidence follows from restricted endowment additivity and en-
dowment continuity alone (Proposition 2), but this is not true for larger populations. Instead,
full compensation consistency plays an essential role. Most simply, full compensation consistency
12
(a) Discontinuities when the endowment equals a
claim.
(b) Multiple discontinuities.
(c) CEA modified to favor agent 1. (d) CEA modified to favor agent 2.
Figure 2: Illustrating independence of axioms in Proposition 2: Discontinuous rules satisfying
restricted endowment additivity. (a) The rule awards the entire endowment to agent 2 until the
endowment is sufficient to fill the smallest claim, at which point the rule awards the full endowment to
the agent with that claim. The rule switches again when it is possible to fill the claim of the agent with
the larger endowment. (b) Provided that at least one claim remains filled, restricted endowment additivity
is consistent with arbitrarily “switching” between filling one agent’s claim and the other agent’s claim. (c)
The rule fills agent 1’s claim as soon as it is feasible to do so and follows CEA otherwise. (d) The rule fills
agent 2’s claim as soon as it is feasible to do so and follows CEA otherwise.
ensures that the collection of fixed-population rules is path consistent, but its implications run
deeper because the force of restricted endowment additivity and endowment continuity is greatly
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reduced in problems with three or more agents. Although full compensation consistency relates
only in a small subset of problems, its force complements that of restricted endowment additivity
so that their combination imposes considerably greater structure on rules than either axiom alone.
Our next examples verify independence of the axioms in Theorem 1. Of course, a great many
rules satisfy continuity and consistency, but not restricted endowment additivity. These include
the all equal sacrifice rules (Young 1987a) besides the proportional rule, as well as all members of
the Talmud family (Moreno-Ternero and Villar 2006) besides the constrained equal awards rule.
Example 2 illustrates the diversity of rules which become admissible without full compensation
consistency, even in the presence of additional axioms.
Example 2. A family of rules satisfying restricted endowment additivity, endowment
monotonicity, anonymity, and minimal sharing, but not full compensation consistency.
Let u ∈ U and let ϕ¯ be a rule satisfying endowment monotonicity, anonymity, and minimal sharing.
For example, ϕ¯ could be CEA, CEL, or in fact any parametric rule (Young 1987b). For eachN ⊆ N
and each (c, E) ∈ CN , let E¯(c, E) ≡ sup{E′ ∈ [0,∑N ci] : P u(c, E′) c} and
ϕ(c, E) ≡
P u(c, E) if E ≤ E¯(c, E)P u(c, E¯(c, E))+ ϕ¯(c− P u(c, E¯(c, E)), E − E¯(c, E)) otherwise .
Since both P u and ϕ¯ satisfy endowment monotonicity, anonymity, and minimal sharing, so does ϕ.
For each N ⊆ N and each (c, E) ∈ CN , if ϕ(c, E)  c, then ϕ(c, E) = P u(c, E). Therefore, since
P u satisfies restricted endowment additivity, ϕ does as well.
In general, ϕ violates full compensation consistency. For example, let N ≡ {1, 2, 3}, cN ≡
(2, 4, 8), E ≡ 8, P u = CEA, and ϕ¯ = CEL. Then
ϕ(c, E) = CEA((2, 4, 6), 6) + CEL((0, 2, 4), 2) = (2, 2, 4).
However, ϕ(c{2,3}, E − ϕ1(c, E)) = CEA((4, 6), 6) = (3, 3) 6= (2, 4) = ϕ{2,3}(c, E).
Endowment continuity is also essential to the characterization. Demonstrating the importance
of endowment continuity in Theorem 1, Example 3 presents a family of rules satisfying restricted
endowment additivity and full compensation consistency, in fact even consistency. Although discon-
tinuous, these rules have a natural interpretation. Each rule proceeds according to a priority order.
If the highest priority agent-claim pair can be filled completely, then the rule does so and otherwise
distributes no award at this point. With the remaining endowment, it proceeds to next highest
priority agent-claim pair and so on. After considering each agent-claim pair, the rule distributes
the remainder of the endowment according to a W-proportional rule, for example CEA or P .
Example 3. A family of rules satisfying restricted endowment additivity and consis-
tency, but not continuity. Let ≺∈ Π and u ∈ U . For each N ⊆ N and each (c, E) ∈ CN , label
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the agents so that (1, c1) ≺ (2, c2) ≺ · · · ≺ (n, cn). Let N0(c, E) ≡ ∅ and for each k = 1, . . . , n,
recursively define Nk(c, E) ≡ Nk−1 ∪ {k} if ck ≤ E −
∑
Nk−1(c,E) cj . Now for each i ∈ N , let
ϕ≺i (c, E) ≡
ci if i ∈ Nn(c, E)P ui (cN\Nn(c,E), E −∑Nn(c,E) cj) otherwise .
That is, ϕ≺ gives priority to agent-claim pairs according to ≺, but only if the claim can be filled.
To distribute the remainder of the endowment, ϕ≺ follows a W-proportional rule.
For each N ⊆ N and (c, E) ∈ CN , if ϕ≺(c, E) c, then Nn(c, E) = ∅ and ϕ≺(c, E) = P u(c, E).
Therefore, ϕ≺ satisfies restricted endowment additivity. To see that it is consistent, let N ⊆ N ,
(c, E) ∈ CN , and i ∈ N . If i ∈ Nn(c, E), then ϕi(c, E) = ci and Nn−1(c−i, E − ci) = Nn(c, E)\{i}.
Then also E −∑Nn(c,E) cj = (E − ci) −∑Nn−1(c−i,E−ci) cj , so ϕ−i(c, E) = ϕ(c−i, E − ci). Now
suppose i 6∈ Nn(c, E) and let xi ≡ P ui
(
cN\Nn(c,E), E −
∑
)Nn(c, E)cj
)
. Then ϕi(c, E) = xi and
Nn−1(c−i, E − xi) = Nn(c, E) so ϕNn(c,E)(c, E) = ϕNn(c,E)(c−i, E − ci). Also, E −
∑
Nn(c,E)
cj =
E −∑Nn−1(c−i,E−xi) cj and P u is consistent, so
ϕN\(Nn(c,E)∪{i})(c, E) = P
u
N\(Nn(c,E)∪{i})
c, E − ∑
Nn(c,E)
cj

= P uN\(Nn−1(c−i,E−Pui (c,E))∪{i})
c, E − ∑
Nn−1(c−i,E−Pui (c,E))
cj

= ϕN\(Nn−1(c,E)∪{i})
(
c−i, E − xi
)
.
Thus, ϕ−i(c, E) = ϕ(c−i, E − P ui (c, E)) and ϕ≺ is consistent.
In general, ϕ≺ violates endowment continuity. For example, let N ≡ {1, 2}, cN ≡ (2, 2), (1, 2) ≺
(2, 2), and P u = CEA. Then for E ∈ R+ with E < 2, ϕ≺(c, E) = (E2 , E2 ) and limE→2− ϕ≺(c, E) =
(1, 1). However, ϕ≺(c, 2) = (2, 0).
With additional properties, we characterize subclasses. First, if full compensation consistency
is strengthened to consistency, we ensure uniformity across all populations, characterizing the PW-
proportional rules.
Theorem 2. A rule satisfies restricted endowment additivity, consistency, and endowment con-
tinuity, if and only if it is a PW-proportional rule.
Perhaps most importantly, adding minimal sharing to the axioms of Theorem 2 leads to a
characterization of the W-proportional rules.
Theorem 3. A rule satisfies restricted endowment additivity, consistency, endowment continuity,
and minimal sharing if and only if it is a W-proportional rule.
15
Within the W-proportional family, additional properties27 restrict the function u.
Corollary 2. For each u ∈ U , P u satisfies
1. equal treatment of equals if and only if u ∈ U∗.
2. claims monotonicity if and only if for each i ∈ N , u(i, ·) is non-decreasing.
3. claims continuity if and only if for each i ∈ N , u(i, ·) is continuous.
4. homogeneity if and only if for each i ∈ N , u(i, ·) is homogeneous.
5. claims truncation invariance if and only if for each i ∈ N , u(i, ·) is constant.
With claims truncation invariance, we obtain a new characterization of the constrained equal
awards rule. Compared with Theorem 3, we also strengthen minimal sharing to equal treatment of
equals, but no longer impose endowment continuity.
Proposition 3. The constrained equal awards rule is the unique rule satisfying restricted endow-
ment additivity, consistency, equal treatment of equals, and claims truncation invariance.
The constrained equal awards rule is also characterized by replacing restricted endowment ad-
ditivity in Proposition 3 with composition up (Dagan 1996; Flores-Szwagrzak 2015). In fact, con-
sistency is redundant in this case (Dagan 1996). Thus, under equal treatment of equals and claims
truncation invariance, composition up implies restricted endowment additivity, whereas restricted
endowment additivity does not imply composition up.
3.3 Duality
So far, we have applied the principle of proportionality to awards. A complementary line of inquiry
applies proportionality to losses. The dual of a rule applies the procedure of the original rule, but
to determine the allocation of losses instead of the allocation of awards. Formally,28 the dual of
ϕ, ϕ˙, is defined for each N ⊆ N and each (c, E) ∈ CN , by ϕ˙(c, E) = c − ϕ(c,∑N ci − E). This
notion immediately extends our results to the allocation of losses.
Remark 4. By replacing each axiom in Theorems 1, 2, and 3, and Proposition 3 with their duals,
characterizes of the duals of the corresponding rules.
Duality also leads to a natural additional axiom: A rule should distribute gains and losses
according to the same procedure. That is, the rule should coincide with its dual.29
27A rule ϕ is: claims monotonic if an increase in an agent’s claim never leads to a decrease in the agent’s award;
claims continuous if it is continuous in the vector of claims; and homogeneous if after scaling the claims and
endowment by the same constant, the awards vector is scaled by the same constant.
28We depart from the standard notation for the dual of a rule, ϕd, to avoid confusion that may arise with either
Pud or (Pu)d.
29Aumann and Maschler (1985) introduced this property for claims problems.
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Self-duality: For each N ⊆ N and each (c, E) ∈ CN , ϕ(c, E) = ϕ˙(c, E).
Together with self-duality and null claims consistency, restricted endowment additivity characterizes
the proportional rule.30
Theorem 4. The proportional rule is the unique rule satisfying either (i) restricted endowment
additivity, null claims consistency, and self-duality; or (ii) the dual of restricted endowment ad-
ditivity, the dual of null claims consistency, and self-duality.
Interestingly, although null claims consistency is very mild and implied by full compensation
consistency, Theorem 4 fails without it: Otherwise, any self-dual rule may be applied in problems
in which an agent has a zero claim. A second characterization instead uses minimal sharing.
Proposition 4. The proportional rule is the unique rule satisfying restricted endowment additivity,
null claims consistency, minimal sharing, and the dual of minimal sharing.
Excluding agents with zero claims, the combination of minimal sharing and its dual requires
that the path of awards be interior: No agent’s claim is filled until the endowment reaches the sum
of the claims. Restricted endowment additivity then applies over the full range of endowments, and
this implies that the path of awards is a single segment from the origin to the point representing
the claims.
4 Discussion
We now know a great deal about rules satisfying diverse combinations of desirable properties, and
the rules arising from our analysis can be better understood by comparison to families of rules
identified by other criteria. Considering the natural description of the PW-proportional rules, their
overlap with previously studied families is surprisingly small.
The intuitive description of our rules is most directly comparable to the equal sacrifice rules
(Young 1987a). Recalling a previous observation, for each u ∈ U , N ⊆ N , i, j ∈ N , and (c, E) ∈ CN
such that x ≡ P u(c, E) c, xiu(i,ci) =
xj
u(j,cj)
. In contrast, the equal sacrifice method would require
u(i,xi)
u(i,ci)
=
u(j,xj)
u(j,cj)
. These conditions are jointly satisfied only when u(i, xi) = xi so that u is linear in its
second component. Since equal sacrifice rules require the corresponding ratios hold in all problems,
this singles out the proportional rule. Generalizing so that the equal sacrifice ratio only applies
within “brackets” leads to a larger family including constrained versions of these rules such as the
constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules (Chambers and Moreno-Ternero 2015).
30A similar result characterizes the proportional rule by self-duality together with either composition axiom (Young
1987a). The proportional rule is also singled out by the full strength of endowment additivity (Moulin 1987; Chun
1988), by applying order preservation to groups (Chambers and Thomson 2002), as well as by strategic considerations
(Ju et al. 2007).
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This family is still essentially disjoint from the W-proportional and PW-proportional families, the
proportional and constrained equal awards rules being the only common members.
We observe greater overlap with the more general family of parametric rules characterized by
equal treatment of equals, consistency, and continuity (Young 1987b). Each parametric rule is
defined by a continuous function f : R+ × R → R+ non-decreasing in its second component.31
For each N ⊆ N and each (c, E) ∈ CN , the corresponding rule ϕf makes awards such that for
each i ∈ N , ϕfi (c, E) = f(ci, λ) where λ ∈ R is chosen so that
∑
N ϕ
f
i (c, E) = E. A parametric
rule is a W-proportional rule if there is a continuous function α : R+ → R+ such that for each
(c0, λ) ∈ R+ × R, f(c0, λ) = max{min{α(c0)λ, c0}, 0} so that f is linear in its second component
over the relevant range (i.e. f(c0, λ) = α(c0)λ). Allowing discontinuous α continues to define a
W-proportional rule, although no longer a parametric one; if α is allowed to depend on λ, then the
rule is a parametric rule but not a W-proportional rule.
The parametric rules can be generalized to allow asymmetric treatment among agents by choos-
ing individual-specific functions (Stovall 2014a). This larger family includes many additional W-
proportional and also PW-proportional rules. Since the PW-proportional rules are consistent, those
satisfying additional continuity properties are members of this family. The additional properties
exclude some PW-proportional rules, however, which may be discontinuous with respect to the
claims vector. Within the family of generalized parametric rules, restricted endowment additivity
requires that the defining functions be essentially linear.
Next consider the family of rules distinguished by the two composition axioms together with
consistency (Moulin 2000; Chambers 2006).32 Among the W-proportional rules, the combination of
the two composition axioms essentially implies claims truncation invariance33. From Corollary 2,
P u satisfies claims truncation invariance if and only if u is independent of claims. In fact, each
of these rules satisfies both composition axioms as well as homogeneity and so is a member of
the family identified by Moulin (2000). Moreover, these are precisely the “weighted constrained
equal awards rules” (WCEA) studied by Flores-Szwagrzak (2015). The members common to
these families, then, consist of the WCEA rules together with the proportional rule. Flores-
Szwagrzak (2015) characterizes the WCEA rules by composition up, consistency, claims truncation
invariance, and positive awards.34 Since the WCEA rules are W-proportional rules, comparison of
the characterizing axioms shows that composition up implies restricted endowment additivity under
the other axioms. The converse implication is not true, however, as the W-proportional family
includes more than the WCEA rules.
31Also required is that for each c0 ∈ R+, limλ→−∞ f(·, λ) = 0 and limλ→∞ f(c0, λ) = c0.
32The difference between the families is whether homogeneity is also imposed. Since a weak form of homogeneity
follows from restricted endowment additivity, the difference is insubstantial for comparison with our rules.
33The exception is the proportional rule itself.
34This axiom is similar in spirit to and implies minimal sharing. It requires that in each problem with a positive
endowment, all agents with positive claims receive positive awards. The main theorem in Flores-Szwagrzak (2015)
characterizes “priority-augmented” extensions of WCEA rules by the first three axioms.
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PW-prop. W-prop. CEA P
rest. endow. add. + + + +
endow. add. (P ) (P ) − +
homogeneity ∗ ∗ + +
full comp. continuity + + + +
endow. continuity + + + +
endow. monotonicity + + + +
null claims consistency + + + +
full comp. consistency + + + +
consistency + + + +
minimal sharing ∗ + + +
equal treatment ∗ ∗ + +
claims trunc. inv. ∗ ∗ + −
self-duality ∗ ∗ + +
Thm 2 Thm 3 Prop 3 Thm 4
Table 1: Properties satisfied by PW-proportional rules. Symbols +, ∗, and − indicate that a
property is satisfied by all, some, or none of the rules in a family. Characterization results are noted in the
final line with boxes indicating the characterizing axioms.
Distinguishing another subfamily of the W-proportional rules, we find the “compromise” rules
recently introduced by Thomson (2015c). These rules award a weighted average of the recommen-
dations of the proportional and constrained equal awards rules. When extended from two to many
claimants by consistency, these rules are precisely the W-proportional rules which preserve order
in the sense that agents with higher claims receive higher awards. Interestingly, another method of
compromise that instead takes a weighted average of the paths of awards of the proportional and
constrained equal awards rules is disjoint from the PW-proportional rules aside from the limiting
rules themselves (Thomson 2015d).35 Other families extend the “Talmud” rule.36 The Talmud rule
is not a PW-proportional rule; in fact, the overlap with each of these families consists of only the
constrained equal awards rule.
Beyond claims problems, our approach also applies to sharing a surplus where even the full
strength of endowment additivity no longer characterizes a single rule (Moulin 1987). Although
we do not pursue it here, this line of inquiry will be a productive avenue for future research. To
conclude, we summarize our result in Table 4.
35A related approach leads to an “egalitarian rule”, which is also not a PW-proportional rule (Gime´nez-Go´mez
and Peris 2014).
36This rule is introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1985) and generalized variously by Hokari and Thomson
(2003), Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006), and Thomson (2008)
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A Omitted proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. For reference in the proof, we call the condition described in the lemma the “scaling prop-
erty”. First suppose that ϕ satisfies the scaling property. Let N ⊆ N and (c, E) ∈ CN be
such that ϕ(c, E)  c and let E1, E2 ∈ R+ be such that E1 + E2 = E. Let α ≡ E1E so
1 − α = E2E . Then α ∈ [0, 1], so by the scaling property, ϕ(c, E1) = ϕ(c, αE) = αϕ(c, E) and
ϕ(c, E2) = ϕ(c, (1− α)E) = (1− α)ϕ(c, E). Therefore,
ϕ(c, E1) + ϕ(c, E2) = αϕ(c, E) + (1− α)ϕ(c, E) = ϕ(c, E).
Therefore, ϕ satisfies restricted endowment additivity.
Conversely, suppose that ϕ satisfies restricted endowment additivity. Let N ⊆ N and (c, E) ∈
CN be such that ϕ(c, E)  c. First we show that ϕ(c, ·) is continuous on {E′ : ϕ(c, E′)  c}.
Let ε ∈ R++ and let E1, E2 ∈ {E′ : ϕ(c, E′)  c} be such that E1 ≤ E2 and |E1 − E2| < ε|N | .
By restricted endowment additivity, ϕ(c, E2) = ϕ(c, E1) + ϕ(c, E2 − E1). Also, for each i ∈ N ,
0 ≤ ϕi(c, E2 − E1) ≤ E2 − E1, so
∣∣ϕi(c, E2)− ϕi(c, E1)∣∣ = ϕi(c, E2 − E1) ≤ E2 − E1 < ε|N | .
Then ‖ϕ(c, E2)− ϕ(c, E1)‖ <∑N ε|N | = ε. Therefore, ϕ(c, ·) is continuous on {E′ : ϕ(c, E′) c}.
Now we verify the scaling property. By restricted endowment additivity, ϕ(c, E) = ϕ(c, E2 ) +
ϕ(c, E2 ) = 2ϕ(c,
E
2 ). By repeated application of restricted endowment additivity, for each k ∈
N, ϕ(c, E) = kϕ(c, Ek ). Similarly, ϕ(c,
2E
k ) = ϕ(c,
E
k ) + ϕ(c,
E
k ) = 2ϕ(c,
E
k ). Again by repeated
application of restricted endowment additivity, for each l ∈ N with l ≤ k, ϕ(c, E) = kϕ(c, Ek ) =
k
l ϕ(c,
lE
k ). That is, for each q ∈ Q+ ∩ [0, 1], qϕ(c, E) = ϕ(c, qE). Then by continuity on {E′ :
ϕ(c, E′) c}, for each α ∈ [0, 1], αϕ(c, E) = ϕ(c, αE).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Each PW-proportional rule satisfies the axioms of the proposition, so we prove the converse.
Let ϕ be a rule satisfying the axioms of the proposition. Let N ⊆ N with |N | = 2 and c ∈ RN+ .
If either agent’s claim is zero, then the awards are completely specified by feasibility and all rules
coincide, so suppose 0 c. To calibrate the candidate PW-proportional rule, let c0 ≡ 12 minN ci > 0
and w(N, c) ≡ ϕ(c,c0)c0 . That is, w(N, c) represents the fractions of the endowment awarded to each
agent at (c, c0). By construction,
∑
N wi(N, c) = 1 and ϕ(c, c0)  c. Labeling the agents i
and j, we choose P≺,u so that: (i) if 0  w(N, c), then (i, ci) ∼ (j, cj), u(i, ci) = wi(N, c), and
u(i, ci) = wi(N, c); and (ii) if wi(N, c) = 0 so wj(N, c) = 1, then (i, ci) ≺ (j, cj). By construction,
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ϕ(c, c0) = P
≺,u(c, c0).
We show that ϕ coincides with P≺,u. Let E¯ ≡ sup{E′ ∈ R+ : ϕ(c, E′) c}. By feasibility and
definition of c0, 0 < c0 < 2c0 ≤ E¯. Let E ∈ R+ with E ≤
∑
N ci so (c, E) ∈ CN . If E ≤ c0, then
by Lemma 1,
ϕ(c, E) = ϕ(c, Ec0 c0) =
E
c0
ϕ(c, c0) = w(N, c)E =
E
c0
P≺,u(c, c0) = P≺,u(c, E).
If c0 < E < E¯, then ϕ(c, E) c and P≺,u(c, E) c so again by Lemma 1,
c0
E ϕ(c, E) = ϕ(c,
c0
EE) = ϕ(c, c0) = w(N, c)c0 = P
≺,u(c, c0) = P≺,u(c, c0EE) =
c0
E P
≺,u(c, E)
and ϕ(c, E) = P≺,u(c, E). By endowment continuity, ϕ(c, ·) is continuous at E¯, so ϕ(c, E¯) =
w(N, c)E¯ = P≺,u(c, E¯) as well. Therefore, ϕ(c, ·) coincides with P≺,u(c, ·) on [0, E¯].
Finally, suppose E¯ < E. Then E¯ <
∑
N ci. By endowment continuity, there is i ∈ N such
that ϕi(c, E¯) = ci = P
≺,u(c, E¯). Let j ∈ N\{i}. Then P≺,u(c, E) = (ci, E − ci). Suppose by
way of contradiction that ϕ(c, E¯) 6= (ci, E − ci). By definition of E¯, ϕ(c, E) 6 c, so ϕ(c, E) =
(E − cj , cj). Let Eˆ ≡ inf{E′ ∈ [E¯, E] : ϕ(c, E′) = (E′ − cj , cj)}. Now E¯ < Eˆ, so ϕ(c, Eˆ) ∈
{(ci, Eˆ − ci), (Eˆ − cj , cj)}. But (ci, Eˆ − ci) 6= (Eˆ − cj , cj), so this violates endowment continuity.
Instead, ϕ(c, E) = (ci, E − ci) = P≺,u(c, E).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Each collection of fixed-population PW-proportional rules satisfies restricted endowment
additivity and endowment continuity. If the weights are path-consistent, then the weights are
proportional in all pairs of problems meeting the hypothesis of full compensation consistency, so
each path-consistent collection of PW-proportional rules satisfies full compensation consistency as
well.
For the converse, let ϕ be a rule satisfying the axioms of the theorem. By Proposition 2, ϕ
coincides with a fixed-population PW-proportional rule for each two-claimant problem. First we
show that once an agent’s claim is filled, it remains filled as the endowment increases. With this
fact in hand, we show that the rule coincides with a PW-proportional rule for each fixed population
and verify path consistency.
Step 1: For each N ⊆ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each E′ ∈ R+ with E′ ≤ E,
{i ∈ N : ϕ(c, E′) = ci} ⊆ {i ∈ N : ϕ(c, E) = ci}. We proceed by induction on the number of
agents. By Proposition 2, the assertion is true for all populations of size at most two. Let N ⊆ N
and suppose that the assertion is true for all populations smaller than N : for each Nˆ ⊆ N with
|Nˆ | < |N |, each (cˆ, Eˆ) ∈ CNˆ , and each Eˆ′ ∈ R+ with Eˆ′ ≤ Eˆ, {i ∈ N : ϕ(cˆ, Eˆ′)} ⊆ {i ∈ N : ϕ(cˆ, Eˆ)}.
Let (c, E) ∈ CN and E′ ∈ R+ with E′ < E. Let N0 ≡ {i ∈ N : ϕ(c, E) = ci} and N ′0 ≡ {i ∈
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N : ϕ(c, E′) = ci} and suppose by way of contradiction that N ′0 6⊆ N0. Then |N | > 2, N ′0 6= ∅, and
since E′ < E ≤∑N ci, N ′0 6= N . Let E¯ ≡ inf {Eˆ ∈ [E′, E] : {i ∈ N : ϕi(c, Eˆ) = ci} 6= N ′0} and let
N¯0 ≡ {i ∈ N : ϕ(c, E¯) = ci}. By endowment continuity, ϕ(c, ·) is continuous at E¯, so E′ ≤ E¯ < E
and N¯0 = N
′
0. Also, by endowment continuity and the definition of E¯, there is E
′′ ∈ [E¯, E] such
that {i ∈ N : ϕ(c, E′′) = ci} 6= N¯0 and for each j ∈ N\N¯0, ϕj(c, E¯) − ϕj(c, E′′) < cj − ϕj(c, E¯).
Let N ′′0 ≡ {i ∈ N : ϕ(c, E′′) = ci}, N ′′ ≡ N\N ′′0 , and E′′0 ≡
∑
N ′′0
cj . Then N
′′
0 ⊆ N¯0. By full
compensation consistency,
ϕN ′′(c, E¯) = ϕ
cN ′′ , E¯ − ∑
N\N ′′
ϕj(c, E¯)
 = ϕ
cN ′′ , E¯ −∑
N ′′0
cj
 = ϕ(cN ′′ , E¯ − E′′0 ) and
ϕN ′′(c, E
′′) = ϕ
cN ′′ , E′′ − ∑
N\N ′′
ϕj(c, E
′′)
 = ϕ
cN ′′ , E′′ −∑
N ′′0
cj
 = ϕ(cN ′′ , E′′ − E′′0 ).
Now E¯ < E′′, so by hypothesis,
{j ∈ N ′′ : ϕj(cN ′′ , E¯ − E′′0 ) = cj} ⊆ {j ∈ N ′′ : ϕj(cN ′′ , E′′ − E′′0 ) = cj}.
But N ′′0 ⊆ N¯0 and N ′′0 6= N¯0, so there is i ∈ N¯0\N ′′0 . Then i ∈ N ′′ and
ϕi(cN ′′ , E
′′ − E′′0 ) = ϕi(c, E′′) < ci = ϕi(c, E¯) = ϕi(cN ′′ , E¯ − E′′0 ).
That is, i ∈ {j ∈ N ′′ : ϕj(cN ′′ , E¯ − E′′0 ) = cj} and i 6∈ {j ∈ N ′′ : ϕj(cN ′′ , E′′ − E′′0 ) = cj}, which
contradicts {j ∈ N ′′ : ϕj(cN ′′ , E¯ − E′′0 ) = cj} ⊆ {j ∈ N ′′ : ϕj(cN ′′ , E′′ − E′′0 ) = cj}. Instead,
N ′0 ⊆ N0.
Step 2: For each N ⊆ N , ϕ is a fixed-population PW-proportional rule. First, agents
with zero claims are fully compensated in each problem. By full compensation consistency, the
awards of agents with positive claims are unchanged when these agents are excluded, so it suffices
to consider problems in which all claims are positive. To calibrate the candidate PW-proportional
rule, for each N ⊆ N and each c ∈ RN++, let c0 ≡ 12 minN ci and w(N, c) ≡ ϕ(c,c0)c0 . Then for
each i ∈ N , wi(N, c) is the fraction of the endowment that ϕ awards to agent i at (c, c0). By
construction,
∑
N wi(N, c) = 1 and ϕ(c, c0) c.
We argue by induction on the number of agents. By Proposition 2, the assertion is true for
populations of size at most two. Now let N ⊆ N with |N | > 2 and suppose that ϕ coincides with a
fixed-population PW-proportional rule for each population smaller than N : for each Nˆ ⊆ N with
|Nˆ | < |N |, there are ≺∈ Π and u ∈ U such that for each (cˆ, Eˆ) ∈ CNˆ , ϕ(cˆ, Eˆ) = P≺,u(cˆ, Eˆ).
Let c ∈ RN++. Define E¯ ≡ inf{E ∈ R+ : ∃i ∈ N, ϕi(c, E) = ci} and N¯ ≡ {i ∈ N : ϕi(c, E¯) = ci}.
If N¯ = N , then E¯ =
∑
N ci and for each i ∈ N , wi(N, c) = ci∑
N ci
and ϕ coincides with the
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proportional rule: for each E ∈ R+ with E ≤
∑
N ci, ϕ(c, E) = P (c, E). Suppose instead that
N¯ 6= N and let E0 ≡
∑
N¯ ci.
By Lemma 1, for each E ∈ R+ with E < c0, ϕ(c, E) = ϕ(c, Ec0 c0) = Ec0ϕ(c, c0) = w(N, c)E.
Similarly, for each E ∈ R+ with c0 < E < E¯, ϕ(c, E)  c, so again by Lemma 1, c0E ϕ(c, E) =
ϕ(c, c0EE) = ϕ(c, c0) = w(N, c)c0. Also, by endowment continuity, ϕ(c, E¯) = w(N, c)E¯. Altogether,
for each E ∈ R+ with E ≤ E¯, ϕ(c, E) = w(N, c)E.
By hypothesis, there are ≺∈ Π and u ∈ U such that ϕ coincides with P≺,u for each (cˆ, Eˆ) ∈
CN\N¯ . Re-scaling if necessary, we may suppose that ∑N\N¯ u(i, ci) = ∑N\N¯ wi(N, c). We now
extend P≺,u|N\N¯ from N\N¯ to N . For each i ∈ N¯ , let u(i, ci) ≡ wi(N, c) and let ≺ be such that
for each j ∈ N , if wj(N, c) > 0, (i, ci) ∼ (j, cj) and if wj(N, c) = 0, then (i, ci) ≺ (j, cj). Now let
E ∈ R+ with E ≤
∑
N ci. By construction, if E ≤ E¯, then ϕ(c, E) = P≺,u(c, E). Suppose instead
that E¯ < E. By Step 1, ϕN¯ (c, E) = cN¯ = PN¯ (c, E). It remains to consider N\N¯ .
By full compensation consistency, ϕN\N¯ (c, E) = ϕ(cN\N¯ , E −E0) = P≺,u(cN\N¯ , E −E0). Now
ϕ(cN\N¯ , E¯ − E0
) cN\N¯ and ϕ(cN\N¯ , E¯ − E0) = ϕN\N¯ (c, E¯), so
w(N\N¯ , cN\N¯ )(E¯ − E0) = ϕ(cN\N¯ , E¯ − E0) = ϕN\N¯ (c, E¯) = wN\N¯ (N, c)E¯.
Since E0 =
∑
N¯ ϕi(c, E¯) =
∑
N¯ wi(N, c)E¯ and
∑
N wi(N, c) =
∑
N\{N¯}wi(N\N¯ , cN\N¯ ), this im-
plies that for each pair i, j ∈ N\N¯ ,
wi(N\N¯ , cN\N¯ )
wi(N, c)
=
E¯ − E0
E¯
=
wj(N\N¯ , cN\N¯ )
wj(N, c)
.
Furthermore, by the definition of P≺,u,
u(i, ci)
u(j, cj)
=
ϕi(cN\N¯ , E¯ − E0)
ϕj(cN\N¯ , E¯ − E0)
=
wi(N\N¯ , cN\N¯ )
wj(N\N¯ , cN\N¯ )
.
By our normalization,
∑
N\N¯ u(i, ci) =
∑
N\N¯ wi(N, c), so in fact for each i ∈ N\N¯ , u(i, ci) =
wi(N, c). Therefore, for each E ∈ R+ with E ≤
∑
N ci, ϕ(c, E) = P
≺,u(c, E).
Step 3: ϕ is a path-consistent collection of PW-proportional rules. By Step 2, ϕ is a
collection of fixed-population PW-proportional rules. To see that the collection is path-consistent,
let N ⊆ N , (c, E) ∈ CN , and i ∈ N . Suppose that ϕi(c, E) = ci and let P≺,u and P ≺ˆ,uˆ be the
components of ϕ associated with N and N\{i} respectively. Then by full compensation consistency,
P≺,u−i (c, E) = ϕ−i(c, E) = ϕ
(
c−i, E − ϕi(c, E)
)
= P ≺ˆ,uˆ
(
c−i, E − ϕi(c, E)
)
.
Let j, k ∈ N\{i}. Then P≺,uj (c, E) = 0 if and only if P ≺ˆ,uˆj
(
c−i, E−ϕi(c, E)
)
= 0 and P≺,uk (c, E) = 0
if and only if P ≺ˆ,uˆk
(
c−i, E − ϕi(c, E)
)
= 0, so (j, cj) ≺ (k, ck) if and only if (j, cj)≺ˆ(k, ck). Also, if
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P≺,uj (c, E) > 0, then
u(k, ck)
u(j, cj)
=
P≺,uk (c, E)
P≺,uj (c, E)
=
P ≺ˆ,uˆk
(
c−i, E − ϕi(c, E)
)
P ≺ˆ,uˆj
(
c−i, E − ϕi(c, E)
) = uˆ(k, ck)
uˆ(j, cj)
.
Therefore, u and uˆ are related by a re-scaling on (N\{i}, c−i). Since this is true for each population
and each problem, the collection of fixed-population PW-proportional rules is path-consistent.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We have seen that each PW-proportional rule satisfies the axioms, so let ϕ be a rule satisfying
the axioms of the theorem. By Theorem 1, ϕ is a path-consistent collection of fixed-population
PW-proportional rules. Let N ⊆ N , N ′ ⊆ N . Let P≺,u and P≺′,u′ be the fixed-population
PW-proportional rules which coincide with ϕ on N and N ′ respectively.
Step 1: ≺ |N ′ =≺′ |N ′. Let c ∈ RN+ and j, k ∈ N ′. First suppose that (j, cj) ≺N (k, ck). Then
there is E ∈ R+ with E ≤
∑
N ci such that ϕj(c, E) > 0 = ϕk(c, E). By repeated application of
consistency, ϕj
(
cN ′ , E −
∑
N\N ′ ci
)
= ϕj(c, E) > 0 and ϕk
(
cN ′ , E −
∑
N\N ′ ci
)
= ϕk(c, E) = 0.
Therefore, (j, cj) ≺N ′ (k, ck). If instead (j, cj) ∼N (k, ck). Then there is E ∈ R+ with E ≤
∑
N ci
such that 0 < ϕj(c, E) < cj and 0 < ϕk(c, E) < ck. By repeated application of consistency,
ϕj
(
cN ′ , E −
∑
N\N ′ ci
)
= ϕj(c, E) and ϕk
(
cN ′ , E −
∑
N\N ′ ci
)
= ϕk(c, E), so 0 < ϕj
(
cN ′ , E −∑
N\N ′ ci
)
< cj and 0 < ϕk
(
cN ′ , E −
∑
N\N ′ ci
)
< ck. Therefore, (j, cj) ∼N ′ (k, ck). Altogether,
≺′ |N ′ =≺ |N ′ .
Step 2: u|N ′ and u′|N ′ are proportional. Let c ∈ RN+ and j, k ∈ N ′ with (j, cj) ∼N (k, ck). By
Step 1, (j, cj) ∼N ′ (k, ck) as well. There is E ∈ R+ with E ≤
∑
N ci such that 0 < ϕj(c, E) < cj
and 0 < ϕk(c, E) < ck. Then
ϕj(c,E)
ϕk(c,E)
=
u(j,cj)
u(k,ck)
. By repeated application of consistency, ϕj
(
cN ′ , E−∑
N\N ′ ci
)
= ϕj(c, E) and ϕk
(
cN ′ , E −
∑
N\N ′ ci
)
= ϕk(c, E), so 0 < ϕj
(
cN ′ , E −
∑
N\N ′ ci
)
< cj
and 0 < ϕk
(
cN ′ , E −
∑
N\N ′ ci
)
< ck. Then
ϕj
(
cN′ ,E−
∑
N\N′ ci
)
ϕj
(
cN′ ,E−
∑
N\N′ ci
) = u′(j,cj)u′(k,ck) . Combining results,
u(j,cj)
u(k,ck)
=
u′(j,cj)
u′(k,ck)
and so u|N ′ and u′|N ′ are proportional.
By Steps 1 and 2, ≺N ′ and u′ may be replaced by ≺N and u without changing any awards.
Moreover, this is true for each pair N,N ′ ⊆ N with N ′ ⊆ N . In general, let N,N ′ ⊆ N and
consider N ′′ ≡ N ∪N ′. Then by Steps 1 and 2, replacing ≺N ′ and ≺N ′′ with ≺N and replacing u′
and u′′ with u does not change any awards. Continuing in this fashion, we conclude that there are
≺∈ Π and u ∈ U such that for each N ⊆ N , ≺N |N =≺ |N and uN |N is proportional to u|N . Thus,
ϕ = P≺,u.
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We have seen that each W-proportional rule satisfies the axioms of the theorem, so let ϕ be
a rule satisfying these axioms. By Theorem 2, ϕ is a PW-proportional rule: there are ≺∈ Π and
u ∈ U such that ϕ = P≺,u. To show that ϕ is a W-proportional rule, let N ⊆ N and (c, E) ∈ CN .
Let i, j ∈ N and suppose that ci > 0, cj > 0, and E > 0. Since E > 0, there is k ∈ N such that
ϕk(c, E) > 0. Then by minimal sharing, ϕi(c, E) > 0 and ϕj(c, E) > 0. Therefore, (i, ci) ∼ (j, cj).
Since this is true for each pair of agents with positive claims and in each problem, ≺ is the complete
indifference relation and ϕ = P≺,u = P u.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The constrained equal awards rule satisfies the axioms, so let ϕ be a rule satisfying the
axioms of the proposition.
Step 1: Coincidence for small endowments. Let N ⊆ N and c ∈ RN+ . By consistency, the
presence of agents with zero claims has no bearing on the awards of the remaining agents, so we
may suppose c ∈ RN++. Let c0 ≡ 12 minN ci. By claims truncation invariance and equal treatment
of equals,
ϕ(c, c0) = ϕ
(
(c0, . . . , c0), c0
)
=
(
c0
|N | , . . . ,
c0
|N |
)
= CEA(c, c0).
Let E ∈ R+ with E ≤
∑
N ci. First suppose that ϕ(c, E)  c. If E ≤ c0, then by Lemma 1,
E
c0
ϕ(c, c0) = ϕ
(
c, Ec0 c0
)
= ϕ(c, E). If c0 < E, then by Lemma 1,
c0
E ϕ(c, E) = ϕ
(
c, c0E E
)
= ϕ(c, c0).
Therefore, for each E ∈ R+ such that ϕ(c, E)  c, ϕ(c, E) = Ec0 ϕ(c, c0) = Ec0 CEA(c, c0) =
CEA(c, E). In particular, this is true for each E ∈ R+ such that E < |N |minN ci.
Step 2: Coincidence for two-claimant problems. Let N ⊆ N with |N | = 2 and c ∈ RN+ and
label the agents so that c1 ≤ c2. By Step 1, for each E ∈ R+ such that ϕ(c, E)  c, ϕ(c, E) =
CEA(c, E). Suppose by way of contradiction that there is E ∈ R+ with E ≤ c1 + c2 such that
ϕ(c, E) 6= CEA(c, E). Then ϕ(c, E) 6 c and E ≥ 2c1. If c1 = c2, then E = 2c1 and by feasibility,
ϕ(c, E) = (c1, c1) = CEA(c, E). Instead, c1 < c2. Then ϕ(c, E) 6= CEA(c, E) = (c1, E − c1), so
ϕ(c, E) = (E − c2, c2). Since E − c2 < c1, there is k ∈ N such that Ek < c1 + c2 − E. Let N ′ ⊆ N
with |N ′| = k and for each i ∈ N ′, let c′i = c1. By consistency and equal treatment of equals,
ϕ
(
(c1, c2, c
′
−12), c2 + (k + 1)(E − c2)
)
= (E − c2, c2, E − c2, · · · , E − c2).
By choice of k, E < k(c1 + c2 − E), so c2 + (k + 1)(E − c2) < kc1. But then by Step 1,
ϕ
(
(c1, c2, c
′
−12), c2 + (k+ 1)(E − c2)
)
= CEA
(
(c1, c2, c
′
−12), c2 + (k+ 1)(E − c2)
)
=
(
E
k+2 , . . . ,
E
k+2
)
,
a contradiction. Instead, ϕ(c, E) = (c1, E− c1) = CEA(c, E). Therefore, ϕ coincides with CEA on
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the domain of two-claimant problems. Since CEA is the unique consistent rule with this property,
ϕ = CEA.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We prove statement (i); since the properties in the statements are dual, (ii) follows imme-
diately by duality. The proportional rule satisfies the properties of statement (i), so let ϕ be a
rule satisfying these properties. By self-duality, ϕ˙ satisfies restricted endowment additivity as well.
Let N ⊆ N and c ∈ RN+ . By null claims consistency, the presence of agents with zero claims has
no bearing on the awards of the remaining agents, so we may suppose c ∈ RN++. By self-duality,
ϕ
(
c, 12
∑
N ci
)
= c2 . Then by Lemma 1, for each α ∈ [0, 1],
ϕ
(
c,
α
2
∑
N
ci
)
= αϕ
(
c,
1
2
∑
N
ci
)
=
αc
2
and
ϕ˙
(
c,
α
2
∑
N
ci
)
= αϕ˙
(
c,
1
2
∑
N
ci
)
=
αc
2
.
Then furthermore, for each α ∈ [0, 12 ],
ϕ
(
c, α
∑
N
ci
)
= αc,
ϕ˙
(
c, α
∑
N
ci
)
= αc, and
ϕ
(
c, (1− α)
∑
N
ci
)
= c− ϕ˙
(
c, α
∑
N
ci
)
= c− αc = (1− α)c.
Combining results, for each α ∈ [0, 1], ϕ(c, α∑N ci) = αϕ(c,∑N ci) = αc. That is, ϕ is the
proportional rule.
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